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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3506 
___________ 
 
JORGE RALDA; CAROLA LORENA RALDA, 
        Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A73-174-735 and A97-157-207) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 20, 2013 
Before:  FISHER, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 22, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jorge Ralda, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection 
in 1988.  In 1995, Ralda pleaded guilty in New Jersey state court to second degree 
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aggravated assault.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1).  Ralda’s wife, Carola Lorena Ralda, 
who is also a Guatemalan citizen, entered the United States in 2000.     
 In 2007, the Government charged Ralda and his wife with removability for 
entering without inspection, in violation of Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)].  Ralda applied for cancellation of 
removal under INA § 240A(b) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)], and for special rule cancellation 
under the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (“NACARA”).1  An 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or 
“Board”) dismissed Ralda’s appeal.  The Board essentially held that Ralda was ineligible 
for both forms of cancellation because he failed to demonstrate that he had registered on 
or before December 31, 1991, for benefits pursuant to the settlement agreement in Am. 
Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“ABC”).  Ralda 
filed a timely petition for review.   
 We granted the petition for review in part, denied it in part, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.  Ralda v. Att’y Gen., 441 F. App’x 101 (3d Cir. 2011).  As 
relevant here, we held that the BIA erred in concluding that, because Ralda failed to meet 
his burden of establishing that he timely registered for ABC benefits, it did not need to 
address Ralda’s argument that his aggravated assault conviction did not constitute a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  Id. at 104-05.  In particular, we noted that “while the failure to 
                                              
1
 Ralda’s wife was included as a derivative applicant on his applications. 
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timely file for ABC benefits would preclude relief under NACARA, it does not affect 
whether Ralda is eligible for cancellation of removal under § 240A(b)(1).”  Id. at 105.  
“Because the BIA failed to consider Ralda’s contention that his aggravated assault 
conviction was not a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of § 240A(b)(1) eligibility,” 
we remanded the matter to the Board.   
 On remand, the BIA held that “a conviction for aggravated assault under N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.”  See Partyka v. 
Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that court applies a categorical 
approach to determine whether a state law conviction constitutes a crime involving moral 
turpitude).  In reaching that conclusion, the Board found that although the statute under 
which Ralda was convicted “punishes attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another 
with no resulting bodily harm, there is no distinction for immigration purposes with 
respect to moral turpitude between the commission of the substantive crime and the 
attempt to commit it.”  In addition, the BIA determined that a reckless assault – the least 
culpable mental state required for a conviction under § 2C:12-1(b)(1) – can implicate 
moral turpitude.  Consequently, the Board ruled that Ralda was ineligible for cancellation 
of removal under § 240A(b)(1).  INA § 240A(b)(1)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)].  The 
BIA also concluded that Ralda’s wife was ineligible for cancellation of removal because 
she did not accrue the requisite 10 years of continuous physical presence in the United 
States before being served with the notice to appear in 2007.  INA § 240A(b)(1)(A) [8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)]; § 240A(d)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)].  Ralda and his wife 
4 
 
filed another petition for review.  
 We have jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to INA § 242(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1)].   But, as we have repeatedly held, the failure to identify or argue an issue 
in an opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Att’y 
Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010).  The dispositive issue in this case is whether 
the Board properly concluded that Ralda and his wife are statutorily ineligible for 
cancellation of removal.  That determination turns on whether Ralda was convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude, INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), and whether his wife had 
continuously been in the United States for the required 10 years, INA § 240A(d)(1).  
Significantly, however, the petitioners’ counseled brief entirely fails to address these 
questions.  Instead, the petitioners focus on whether “[t]he [IJ] erred as a matter of law in 
the standard . . . used to determine that [Ralda] was statutorily ineligible for” relief under 
NACARA.  As the Government points out, though, we have already held that we lack 
jurisdiction to review the factual determination that Ralda failed to timely register for 
NACARA relief and we rejected his contention that he was not provided with an 
opportunity to testify.  Ralda, 441 F. App’x at 103-04.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that the petitioners have waived any challenge to the BIA’s conclusion that they 
are ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1).  Singh v. Gonzales, 
406 F.3d 191, 195 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
